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Abstract. In the interaction between agents we can have an explica-
tive discourse, when communicating preferences or intentions, and a nor-
mative discourse, when considering normative knowledge. For justifying
their actions our agents are endowed with a Justification and Explana-
tion Logic (JEL), capable to cover both the justification for their com-
mitments and explanations why they had to act in that way, due to the
current situation in the environment. Social commitments are used to
formalise justificatory and explanatory patterns. The combination of ex-
planation, justification, and commitments provides flexibility for defining
several types of argumentative agents.
1 Introduction
The institutional economics demands a clear account of a fuzzy world and is
therefore in accordance [17] with the dictum attributed to Keynes: ”it is better
to be roughly right than precisely wrong”. As many multi-agent systems are
organized in some kind of institution, judging the behavior of agents in such
contexts requires sometimes understanding of how their actions stand vis-a-vis
to the goals of the overall system.
Habermas [17] proposed different types of discourses dealing with different
validity claims. In the interaction between agents we can thus have an explicative
discourse, when communicating knowledge, and a normative discourse, when
considering normative knowledge. For justifying their actions our agents are
endowed with a Justification and Explanation Logic (JEL), capable to cover
both the justification for their commitments and explanations why they had to
act in that way, due to the current situation in the environment. The distinction
between factual and normative knowledge is important in argumentative agents
since facts of various kinds might not provide agents with any choice, while
norms are possible to be bent and eventually changed.
The difference between explanation and justification has not been clearly
delimited in computational models of arguments. From this perspective, there is
a gap between argumentation in the philosophy of science and computational-
based argumentation. Given the idea that argumentation is a means to justify
claims or to persuade other agents of these claims [10], there are two approaches
when defining what ”good argumentation” represents: i) argumentation able to
justify its target claims and ii) argumentation able to convince an audience.
These two lines form the basis for investigating the contrast between justificatory
arguments and explanatory arguments.
The philosophy of science distinguishes between explanatory reasons and nor-
mative or justificatory reasons [12]. While explanations are reasons why events
occur, justifying reasons are ”considerations which count in favor” or ”explana-
tions of ought facts”. Differently, in the computation models of arguments there is
a blurred distinction between explanation-based argumentation and justification-
based argumentation, as in [16], where explanations and evidence are used to
construct justifications.
In many practical domains the distinction between explanation and justifi-
cation has pragmatic force. Many examples come from the legal domain, where
an illegal action can be explained, but in many cases the action is not justified.
For instance, a theft can be explained by the loss of money because the person
lost his job, but it does not have normative justificatory power. Another com-
mon example is based on the well known lack of time explanatory pattern: ”I
could not finalize the task due to lack of time”, with its many instantiations: ”I
could not review the paper because I was at a conference during the deadline”
or ”I could not finalize the article, because input data arrived too late”. In most
situations, this explanation pattern does not have justificatory power at all. In
other words, something can explain a behavior but it cannot always justify it.
In this paper we investigate the inter-living of explanations and justifica-
tions in business-oriented situations. Current business interactions are affected
by postmodern ideas like post-structuralism and heterogeneity at different levels.
In line with postructuralism, business commitments act as a flexible framework
for guiding business interactions, agents preferring soft law against the hard law
governance, whilst the idea of heterogeneity of individuals is reflected at the busi-
ness policy level through the concept of heterogeneity of customers [20]. Consider
the contractual clause in which the debtor a promises to deliver an item to the
creditor b within a pre-agreed deadline. Not meeting the deadline, the agent a
provides an explanation: ”I could not deliver the product because my supplier c
has not delivered the parts yet”. This explanation provides the creditor b with
some insights on the current situation, but it does not have enough justificatory
power in order to justify the behavior of agent a for not delivering the item. It
may be a case in which the supplier c has no normative obligation to deliver the
components of the product: either a commitment C (s , a, pay, parts) for deliver-
ing the parts does not exist between a and the supplier c, or the agent a did
not pay the components in due time. Valid justifications should be normative,
like: ”emergency situation forces me not to deliver the item”, where emergency
is a normative concept. Observe that the emergency justifier does not help the
debtor a to understand the situation. The agent can ask for further explanations
for the conveyed justifier, but also for further normative justifications for it.
The paper advances the state-of-the-art in logic of argumentation in three
ways: i) proposing JEL for handling both justificatory and explanatory argu-
ments; ii) introducing commitments as proof terms; and iii) formalising several
justificatory and explanatory patterns. The remaining of the paper is organised
as follows: Section 2 extends justification logic [2] with explanatory capabilities
and introduces commitments as proof terms. The expressivity of social commit-
ments is exploited in section 3 to represent both justificatory and explanatory
patterns. Section 4 describes types of argumentative agents based on the combi-
nation of justificatory and explanatory attitudes, whilst section 5 illustrates the
developed instrumentation through an illustrative scenario. We end the paper
with related work and conclusions.
2 Commitment-Based Justification and Explanation
The first part of this section extends the justification logic with explanatory
capabilities. The second part illustrates how the concept of commitments used
as proof terms can enact business dialogs.
2.1 Enhancing Justification Logic with Explanation
In order to model justificatory and explanatory arguments we propose an ex-
tended version of the Justification Logic (JL). Justification Logic combines ideas
from epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It provides an evidence-
based foundation for the logic of knowledge, according to which ”F is known” is
replaced by ”F has an adequate justification”.
Simply, instead of ”X is known” (KX ) consider t : X , that is, ”X is known
for the explicit reason t” [2]. Justification logic lacks this component of interpre-
tation. It also lacks the capability to express explanation or partial justification.
This section extends the justification logic with explanatory capabilities, by in-
troducing the explanatory operator t ⊳ F , where t is an explanation for F .
Definition 1. The language of Justification and Explanation Logic JEL con-
tains proof terms t ∈ T and formulas F ∈ F
t : = x | c | t · t | t + t |!t |?t | t ⋗ t
F : = p | F ∨ F | ¬F | t : F | t ⊳ F
Proof terms t are abstract objects that have structure. They are built up
from axiom constants c ∈ Cons , proof variables x ∈ Vars , and operators on
justifications and explanations ·, +, !,?,⋗. The application operator · takes two
proof terms and constructs a new justification based on them. The sum operator
+ concatenates the given proofs, whilst the unary operators ! and ? are used to
request for positive and negative proof terms for a formula in JEL. The operator
precedence decreases as follows: !, ·,+, :, ⊳,¬,∨, and ·,+ are left associative, and
:, ⊳ right associative. To express that t is not probative justification for supporting
F one uses ¬t : F . Parentheses are needed to express that ¬t is a justification
for F : (¬t) : F . Note that justification is used to support negated sentences too,
as in t : ¬F . Similar semantics applies for the explanation operator ⊳.
A0 classical propositional axioms
A1 F → (t : F ∨ t ⊳ F ) (necessity)
A2 s : (F → G)→ (t : F → (s · t) : G) (j-application)
A′2 s ⊳ (F → G)→ (t ⊳ F → (s · t) ⊳G) (e-application)
A′′2 s : (F → G)→ (t ⊳ F → (s · t) ⊳G) (e-application)
A′′′2 s ⊳ (F → G)→ (t : F → (s · t) ⊳G) (e-application)
A3 s : F → (s + t) : F (j-sum)
A4 t : F → !t : (t : F )∨!t ⊳ (t : F ) (proof checker)
A′4 t ⊳ F → !t ⊳ (t ⊳ F ) (explanation checker)
A5 ¬t : F → ?t : (¬t : F )∨?t ⊳ (¬t : F ) (negative proof checker)
A′5 ¬t ⊳ F → ?t ⊳ (¬t ⊳ F ) (negative explanation checker)
Fig. 1. Axioms of JEL.
The axioms of JEL are shown in figure 1, where axiom A1 forces all formulas
F to have a justification or an explanation t . The compounds t : F or t ⊳ F
represent a formula, which should have their own justification. This corresponds
to the principle of inferential justification: for sentence F to be justified on the
basis of t one must justify t and justify that t makes F plausible. Constants
are used to stop the ad infinitum justification chain by representing a kind of
justification that does not depend on other justifiers.
The application axiom A2 takes a justifier s of an implication F → G and a
justifier t of its antecedent F , and produces a justification s · t of the consequent
G. If at least one of the terms s , t represents an explanation, the formula G is
considered only explained, but not justified (axioms A′2, A
′′
2 , and A
′′′
2 ).
The j-sum axiom says that if a formula F is justified by the justifier s , than
for a new justifier t , the formula is still justified. Thus, justification reasoning is
monotonic, new justification not defeating the existing one. The corresponding
axiom for explanation is missing, leaving space for contradictory explanations
and non-monotonic explanatory reasoning. The rationality behind this is that
norms are considered static at a given moment and assumed apriori known by the
participants, whilst explanations are constructed dynamically during a dialog.
Justifications and explanations are assumed to be verified. Based on axiom
A4, a justifier t for formula F can be further justified by the term !t , but it can
also be explained. The axiom A′4 limits the possibility to justify an explanation,
an explanation can only be further explained. The negative proof checker A5
forces agents to provide justifications or explanations why they are not able
to justify a particular formula F . Justifiers cannot be used to justify why the
formula F is not explained by the explanandum t , as axiom A′5 states that only
explanans can be used. A proof term can be stronger than another one, given
by the operator ⋗.
2.2 Commitment Based Proof Terms
One of the issues regards what sort of things can be a justifier. In a normative
framework regulated only by social commitments, a justifier can be represented
Expression Informal Semantics
C (a, b, p, q) :i F C is probative evidence for F for agent i .
¬C (a, b, p, q) :i F C is not probative justification for F for agent i .
(¬C (a, b, p, q)) :i F The absence of C is a justification for F for agent i .
C (a, b, p, q) :i ¬F C (a, b, p, q) is evidence for ¬F for the agent i .
Table 1. Commitment based justification in a multi-agent system.
by such commitments. In the proposed approach, by restricting the acceptable
justifications and explanations to commitments, it means that the proof terms
t in the JEL language represent commitments.
The classical definition of a conditional commitment states that the debtor
x promises to creditor y to bring about a particular formula P under the con-
dition Q , encapsulated as C (x , y,Q ,P). In multi-agent systems, a justification
accepted as probative evidence for an agent may not meet the standard of proof
for another agent, which rejects it. To model this, we link the justification and
explanatory operators to the agent accepting the evidence. Thus, the construc-
tion C (a, b, p, q) :i F says that commitment C is a probative justification for
agent i regarding the sentence F (see table 1). A commitment may be pre-
ferred to another one by the agent i when choosing an explanation, formalized
as (C ≻ C ) ⊳i F . If one of the terms in the commitment is not constrained in
any aspect, “do not care” sign “ ” is used. Examples 1, 2, and 3 illustrate how
the JEL formalism is enacted in a commitment-based multi-agent setting.
Example 1 (Distributed Application). Assume the commitment C (a, b, ,F ) is
agent’s b justification for F and the conditional commitment C (b, c,F ,G) rep-
resents a justification for agent c regarding the formula F → G. According
to axiom A2, the application operator builds a justification for G of the form
C (b, c,F ,G) · C (a, b, ,F ) :b G. Notice that the commitment aggregation is
based on the view of agent b.
C (b, c,F ,G) : cF → G → (C (a, b, ,F ) :b→ C (b, c,F ,G) · C (a, b, ,F ) :b G)
Not being omniscient, agents are not aware of all the consequences from their
commitments. When used by the same agent, the proof checker operator acts as
a positive introspection function, helping agents to be aware of the justification
of their own commitments. Given a commitment C justifying the formula F , the
agent i can inspect its own commitment store to further justify the formula C :i
F by enacting the application of the proof checker operator on itself: !C :i C :i F .
Consequently, given the commitment C an agent can construct a justification
for it based on other commitments.
Example 2 (Positive Introspection). Because agent a has promised agent b to
deliver the item, given by C (a, b,⊤, item), this is the justification of agent a
regarding the commitment C (b, c, parts , pay) with agent c, in which agent b has
to pay the components provided by agent c. Given the right associativity of the
justificatory operator :, parenthesis are introduced only for clarity:
C (a, b,⊤, item) :a [C (b, c, parts , pay) :a Item]
.
Example 3 (Explaining a Justification). Although a hotel specifies in the com-
mitment that check-in is at time 14, usually there is no problem if the guest
arrives at 12. The situation in which the guest is not served, is often not justified
by personnel with the commitment itself (the active contractual relation) but
by other valid justifiers such as: ”no clean rooms at the moment”. The customer
can explain the situation to himself by the reduced number of staff, which can
be further explained by the economical policy of the hotel, with the following
chain of reasoning.
economicalPolicy ⊳guest reducedStaff ⊳guest (¬CleanedRooms) :hotel ¬CheckIn
Justifying the impossibility to check-in by the existing contractual commitment
leads to a different chain of reasoning.
increaseProfit ⊳guest C (hotel , guest , pay, checkIn14) :hotel ¬CheckIn
Given the recurrent nature of business interactions, in common situations
business agents convey the same justificatory and explanatory schemes. The
following section formalizes two justificatory and two explanatory patterns.
3 Justificatory and Explanatory Business Patterns
An explanation involves discovering the meaning of an event in a particular
context, such that an explanandum is explained by a coherent set of explanans .
The explanation aims to understanding the explanandum by indicating what
causes it. An explanation answers to why questions or to contrastive why P rather
than X questions when the opponent requests an explanation for proponent
preferences.
The theory of justification advocates the idea that justification is a normative
activity, where a concept is defined as normative if it depends on norms. The
thing that justifies a proposition is called justifier . Justifiers act as a vehicle
between beliefs and knowledge, as the definition of knowledge as justified true
belief suggests. Supplementary to explanans, a justifier should be legitimate by
objective factors such as social structures, normative frameworks, or abstract
rationality.
To synthesize the differences, a justification acts in a more normative frame-
work, whilst an explanation works in a social context. An explanation implies the
Justification from gratuitous promise + GP
Intent : Stressing out that no one has forced the debtor to commit.
Context : The creditor or other agent perform actions based on the promise.
Pattern: C (a, b,⊤,P) :c F
Variants: b=c, a=c, F=P
Example: Grandfather promises to his nephew to pay for a trip.
Based on it, the father buys a new bag for his son.
JEL: C (grandfather , nephew ,⊤,PayTrip) :father NewBag
Fig. 2. Commitment-based justificatory promise.
existence of an audience which understands the claim and its explanans, whilst
justification is in relation only with an objective world of true beliefs. The above
observations are used to differentiate between two classes of business dialogs:
justification patterns and explanatory patterns.
3.1 Justification Patterns
Commitment-based justification patterns are constructed in terms of the inten-
tion of the agent which provides the justification, the context in which they
are usually used, the formal representation of the pattern, within specific cases.
An example is illustrated by informal text and its representation in JEL. All
commitment-based justification patterns of the general form C (a, b,P ,Q) :c F
may be questioned by a common set of critical questions.
– CQ1: If c 6= b, which is the relationship between the agent c and b?
– CQ2: If F 6= P , which is the link between the formulas F and P?
– CQ3: Is there a stronger commitment which does not justify F?
Specific attacking options for each justification pattern are added at the end of
the pattern.
Gratuitous Promise. In a gratuitous promise the debtor x promises the cred-
itor y to bring about P , without requesting anything: C (x , y,⊤,P). This may
serve as enough justification for agent y for the achievement of P , given by
C (x , y,⊤,P) :y P (figure 2). The debtor is the one affected by the violation of
the commitment. In case the agent enacting the gratuitous promise is not the
creditor, one continuation path regards the relationship between the proponent
of the justification and the creditor. In the example from figure 2, in case CQ1
is risen, the relation between father and son can be legally justified.
For the CQ2 attack, the justification stands only if there is an evident connec-
tion between the promise P and the action F . Note that the particular variant
C (a, b,⊤,P) :b P avoids the above two attacks. Assuming that in sequent step,
Justification from request + R
Intent : Justifying actions based on the directive conveyed by a
normative empowered agent.
Context : The creditor or other agent act on request from other agent.
Pattern : C (a, b,P ,⊤) :c F
Variants : b=c, a=c, F=P, ¬P
Example : During driving lessons, the instructor requests the student to stop
the car. Consequently, the next student’s action is to signal right.
JEL: C (instructor , student , StopCar ,⊤) :student SignalRight
CQ4 : Is the request legitimate?
Fig. 3. Commitment-based justificatory patterns.
the nephew informed that he has no bag for the trip, the grandfather reacts by
assuring his nephew that he will pay both for the trip and buy a new bag. From
the father’s perspective, the newly stronger commitment acts as a justification
for the opposite conclusion ¬NewBag:
C (grandfather , nephew ,⊤,PayTrip ∧ NewBag) :father ¬NewBag
The promise made by the creditor can justify future actions of the creditor
itself. For instance the grandfather starts saving money due to its gratuitous
promise: C (grandfather , nephew ,⊤,PayTrip) :grandfather SaveMoney.
Directives. In a fact request the debtor does not promise anything, it only
requests the precondition q to be satisfied, given by C (a, b, q,⊤) (figure 3). The
additional critical question CQ4 regards the normative rightness of the directive.
For instance, there is no obligation for the agent b to meet the request or, if there
is indeed a power relationship between the creditor and the debtor, it may not
have jurisdiction in the context of the sentence q requested. In the example of
figure 3, the requested action of stopping the car is legitimate by the relationship
between the instructor and the student. If the requested act is negated, the
commitment represents a taboo or an interdiction.
Example 4 (Justification from Interdiction). ”I can not sell you cigarettes be-
cause the law interdicts to sell them to the minors” will be formalized in JEL
as
C (na, ,¬SellCigarMinor ,⊤) :me ¬C (me, you,Pay, SellCigar) :me ¬Sell
Here the law is personalized by the normative agent na. According to contract
law, when exposing an item for selling, an open offer is created. The seller
commits to sell the item in case of acceptance, which usually occurs by pay-
ment: C (seller , buyer ,Pay, Sell). The exact representation captures this when
Explanation from cognitive consistency + CC
Intent : Explaining actions based on the goals that an agent is following.
Context : The debtor commits itself to achieve a particular sentence.
Pattern : C (a, a,Q ,P) ⊳c F
Variant : a=c, Q = ⊤
Example : Tom cannot join the party because he wants to learn for the exam.
JEL: C (tom, tom,⊤,Learn) ⊳jim ¬JoinParty
CQ4: Is the debtor aware of his commitments?
Fig. 4. Explanation for preferred commitment.
the agent me justifies his refuse to sell, because he is not committed to do so,
which is further justified by the normative interdiction to sell cigarettes to the
minors.
The two justificatory patterns introduced above are not exhaustive in terms
of basic justificatory schemes. However, by combining such basic patterns one
can increase the expressivity of the justifiers. Firstly, by composing a gratuitous
promise with a factQ treated as a condition, a unilateral contract UL is obtained:
C (a, b,⊤,P) ◦q Q = C (a, b,Q ,P). The same UL pattern can also be obtained
by composing a request with a fact P treated as a promise: C (a, b,Q ,⊤)◦p P =
C (a, b,Q ,P).
Secondly, when the term used for composition is a commitment itself a higher
order commitment [13] is constructed. In this line, justification from bilateral
contract BC is formalized as C (a, b,C (b, a,⊤, pay), deliver). Here, both parties
make promises: the agent a commits to deliver the item if the agent b promises
to pay. The pattern is a composition between a unilateral contract and a justifi-
cation from request pattern. The composition is applied on the requested action
which represents a commitment itself: C (a, b,Q ,P) ◦q C (b, a,⊤,Q1). For the
given example, the justifier is constructed as follows: BC = C (a, b,
,
deliver) ◦q
C (b, a,⊤, pay). The justification from promise to commit pattern is a composi-
tion of two gratuitous promises, applied on the fourth term of the commitment:
C (a, b,⊤, ) ◦p C (a, c,⊤, pay) = C (a, b,⊤,C (a, c,⊤, deliver)), where agent a
promises agent b that he will commit to agent c to deliver the item.
3.2 Explanation Patterns
Explanation patterns are not rooted in an objective normative frame, having
a subjective component. Explanatory schemes can be viewed as providing sub-
jective reasons, with a more flexible relation between explainers and what is
explained.
Public goals. Consider the situation in which the agent commits itself to bring
about r : C (a, a,⊤, r). It is on the edge between social semantics and mentalistic
Explanation from preferred commitment + PC
Intent : Explaining choice between two commitments.
Context : The debtor is committed with different strengths to creditors.
Pattern : C (a, b,P ,Q) ≻ C (a, c,P ′,Q ′) ⊳d F
Variants : a=d, b=d, c=d
Example : The agent a promised his boss to attend at a late meeting. He also
promised his wife to take the child from the school if he has time.
Aware of the constraint, the wife decides to go to the school herself.
JEL: C (a, boss,⊤,Meeting) ≻ C (a,wife,Time,TakeChild) ⊳wife GoSchool
CQ4 : Is it not possible to achieve the both commitments?
CQ5 : Is the preference relation explained by the cognitive consistency
property of the agent d?
Fig. 5. Commitment-based explanatory preference.
semantics of communicative agents (figure 4). The commitment belongs to the
social semantics because it is public, and points toward the mentalistic approach
because it represents a goal of the agent. Assuming sincere agents, the attack
option CQ4 questions the possibility that the agent may not be aware of all its
commitments.
Explanation from preference. The preference relation usually has a strong
subjective component, making it a candidate for explanatory arguments rather
than justificatory ones. In our example (figure 5), C (a, boss ,⊤,Meeting) is a gra-
tuitous commitment, whilst C (a,wife,Time,TakeChild) is a unilateral contract.
The gratuitous promise representing a stronger promise compared to a unilateral
contract, the preference relation can be deduced based on the strength of each
type of commitment.
4 Argumentation Framework
4.1 Arguing with Justification and Explanation
Definition 2. An argument is a pair 〈t ,F 〉 where t is the chain of justifiers
or explanans and F the conclusion such that t justifies or explains H and t is
minimal.
We distinguish between explanatory arguments and justificatary arguments.
Definition 3. A justificatary argument is supported by justifiers only. An expli-
catary argument contains at least one supporting explanandum.
A fact can be supported at the same time by several explanatory or justificatory
arguments.
Definition 4 (Conflict among arguments). In the case of an undercutting
argument, its conclusion attacks one justifier or explanation in the support of
another argument. In the case of rebuttals, the justified formulas contradict each
other directly.
There are two types of interrogative requests: request for explanation and
request for justification.
Definition 5 (Request for justification). Agent a requests agent b to provide
its justification why t is agent its justification for F : C (a, b, !t :b t :i F ,⊤).
The general case reflects the situation when the agents a, b and i are different.
Example 5 (Request for justification). Consider that the judge agent requests
the lawyer agent to legally support the belief of the victim v that selfDefense is
a justification for useGun, expressed as:
C (judge, lawyer , !selfDefense :lawyer selfDefense :v UseGun,⊤)
Note that the justification !selfDefense is requested to be constructed from the
perspective of the lawyer agent. The expressivity of the language allows to ask the
lawyer to present the victim’s justification regarding the sentence selfDefense :v
UseGun, given by C (judge, lawyer , !selfDefense :v selfDefense :v UseGun,⊤).
When b = i , the agent b is requested to justify itself. When a = b, the
agent a requests itself to identify or construct a justification supporting why
t is accepted by the agent i as valid justifier for F . Not being omniscient, in
JEL, the agents are not assumed to be aware of all the justifications that can
be built from their knowledge base. Only an explicit constructed justification is
considered, which makes sense for the agent to interrogate its own knowledge
base to identify a valid justification. Similarly, when a = b = i , the same agent
is applying itself to the task of justifying its own sentences.
Definition 6 (Request for explanation). Agent a requests agent b to explain
why t is the justification of i for F : C (a, b, !t ⊳j t :i F ,⊤). Similarly, agent a
requests agent b to further explain why t is the explanation of agent i for F :
C (a, b, !t ⊳j t ⊳i F ,⊤).
Notice that one cannot justify an explanation, but an explanation can be
requested both for a justifier and for another explanation. The combination
of the above explicatory/justificatory patterns in dialogs helps the parties to
understand normative-based decisions.
Strength of Justification. The strength of a justification depends on the com-
mitment used as evidence and the formula needed to be justified. The stronger
the commitment used as a justification term, the stronger the justification.
Proposition 1. The commitment C (a, b, q, p) is stronger than C (a, b, q ′, p′) if
the debtor promises more and requests less.
Example 6 (Strength of justification). ”The supplier s commits to deliver more
items faster to the retailer r” is stronger than ”The supplier commits to deliver
the items earlier if he receives the payment earlier”:
C (s , r ,⊤,MoreItems ∧ FasterDeliv)⋗ C (s , r ,PayEarlier ,FasterDeliv)
In the particular case of no promised action (p = ⊤), the same semantics
works for defining stronger requests. Thus, the request pattern C (a, b, p,⊤) is
stronger or more specific than C (a, b, p ∨ q,⊤). This can be used during ne-
gotiation dialogs, where the less stronger request allows more options for the
requester and introduces higher flexibility in the system.
Example 7. The request to pay either by credit card or by wire transfer is
stronger to the wire transfer option, formalized as: C (bank , a, card ∨wired ,⊤)⋗
C (bank , a,wired ,⊤).
Proposition 2. A fact p is stronger than the commitment created to bring about
that p, given by p ⋗ C ( , , , p).
Example 8. ”I commit to deliver the item after you confirm the order” is stronger
then ”I commit to deliver the item if you have promised me to confirm the order”:
C (me, you,Confirm,Deliver) ⋗ C (me, you,C (me, you,⊤,Confirm),Deliver).
A preference relation succ on commitments can be defined based on the
strength of the commitment.
Proposition 3. The creditor prefers stronger commitments, whilst the debtor
prefers weaker commitments when explaining the formula F . If C (a, b,P ,Q) ⋗
C (a, b,P ′,Q ′) then we have the following.
C (a, b,P ,Q) ≻ C (a, b,P ′,Q ′) ⊲a F and C (a, b,P
′
,Q ′) ≻ C (a, b,P ,Q) ⊲b F
Conflict Resolution. In JEL all arguments are considered to have justifications
or explanations. When deciding between two conflicting formula, the stronger
justified formula will be preferred by the debtor, because the stronger commit-
ment provides more guarantees for the promised action. If C (a, b, p, q) :b F and
C (a, b,⊤, q∧r) :b ¬F , the F formula would be accepted. In case the justifications
have the same strength, JEL forces the agents to provide further justifications
on request.
Definition 7 (Preference-based conflict resolution). If F attacks F ′ and
F ′ attacks F and cn ⊲ cn−1 ⊲ ...ci ⊲ cj ⊲ .... ⊲ c1 ⊲ F and c
′
n ⊲ c
′
n−1 ⊲
...c′i+1 ⊲ c
′
i ⊲ .... : c
′
1 ⊲ F
′, F is preferred to F ′ if there is a chain of explanans
c1 ⊲ ...ck so that equalStrength(ck , c
′
k ) ∀ k ∈ [1, i ] and ci+1 ≻ c
′
i+1.
4.2 Argumentative Agents
Combining commitments with justification and explanation logic provides flexi-
bility for defining several types of argumentative agents.
Firstly, regarding the logical framework, in the simplest approach, three types
of agents can be formalized: The less demanding agent requires only explanations
in order to accept a formula, given by the axiom t ⊳i F → F . A rigorous agent
will accept only normative justified formulas: t :i F → F . The most demanding
one requests both explanation and justification before accepting a sentence: t ⊳i
F ∧ s :i F → F . Aggregation of these components can lead for instance to a
caution agent, which accepts a formula F if it has a valid justification and no
valid explanation supporting the opposite conclusion ¬F , formalized as:
t :i F ∧ (¬s) ⊳i ¬F → F
In a more elaborate agent system, the existing theories of justification (foun-
dationalism, infinitism, internalism, externalism [12]) and explanation (causal,
teleological) [15]) can be exploited to define the corresponding agent type. Each
theory requires different amount and type of evidence before a formula can be
considered justified or explained. For a foundationalist agent, the existence of a
basic justificatory pattern would be enough for accepting the supported formula.
Starting from the infinitism theory, a n-type credulous agent accepts a formula if
its justification chain has at least length n. An internalist agent should be able
to justify a sentence only through its own commitments, whilst for an externalist
agent, third party commitments can be used as justifiers.
Secondly, regarding the commitment patterns, agents can convey or accept
as valid justifiers only commitments meeting a strength threshold. By compos-
ing the basic gratuitous promise and request justificatory patterns, one obtains
higher order patterns having different degrees of strength. Table 2 illustrates
possible composed patterns that may justify that the payment will be made.
By promising to deliver an item and only requesting a promise for payment,
the pattern GP + (R ◦q GP) is the weakest one, when justifying the formula
Pay. Only an agent having a low justification standard as scintilla of justifica-
tion would accept this pattern as valid justification. A little bit stronger justi-
fication is given by the pattern GP + R where a promise for delivering and a
request for paying do exist. The agent a should have the reasonable justification
proof standard to accept this justifier. In the bilateral contract UC ◦q GP the
promise to pay representing a precondition for delivering, gives preponderence of
justification for the agent a to consider it as a valid justifier. The pattern UC
meets the convincing justification standard of proof of the agent a, whilst the
most attractive pattern for the agent a is UC ◦pGP , where it promises to deliver
the item only after the payment is finalized. This justifier should meet the most
skeptical standard of proof of an agent, which is behind any reasonable doubt.
Thirdly, with respect to the explanatory component, the cognitive consistent
pattern is used by sincere agents. Such an agent is committed to itself to bring
about the items that he promised to perform. It comes with several flavors: An
wholehearted agent x would try to bring about p if he promised to do so, no
Pattern Justifier Meaning
GP + (R ◦q GP) C (a, b,⊤, deliver)+ a commits to deliver the item and
C (a, b,C (b, a,⊤, pay),⊤) :a Pay requests b to commit to pay for it.
GP + R C (a, b,⊤, deliver)+ a commits to deliver the item
C (a, b, pay,⊤) :a Pay and requests b to pay for it.
UC ◦q GP C (a, b,C (b, a,⊤, pay), deliver) :a Pay a commits to deliver the item
if b commits a to pay for it.
UC C (a, b, pay, deliver) :a Pay a commits to deliver the item
in case b pays for it.
UC ◦p GP C (a, b, pay,C (a, b,⊤, deliver)) :a Pay a will commit to deliver the item if b pays.
Table 2. Composed patterns with varying degrees of strength.
matter who its partner is and no matter if its partner has already performed
or not the requested action: C (x , x ,C (x , , , p), p). Some agents can manifest
sincerity only to some partner y: C (x , x ,C (x , y, , p), p). Here, if the agent x is
committed to the particular agent y than he is committed to itself to bring about
p. Re-assurance can be provided to its partner: “If I have promised you to bring
about p I will.”, given by C (me, you,C (me, you, , p), p) or to a supervisor: “I
am committed to my boss to keep my promises to all agents which do not have to
perform something in exchange.”, formalized as C (me, boss ,C (me, ,⊤, p), p).
Quite differently, for a diffident agent x , even he has promised to bring about
p this is not conclusive for itself that P will hold, given by ¬C (x , y,⊤,P) :x P .
Depending on the justification provided for this sentence, it can be: i) the agent
simply does not trust its capabilities to accomplish the task; ii) the agent is
aware of some stronger commitment that may block the execution of P ; or iii)
he is not committed to itself to satisfy its own promises and it is aware of this.
5 Trip Booking Scenario
s1
s2
t a
na
Commitment Store:
C (t , a, pay3, trip)
C (t , t , flight ∧ acc, trip)
C (s2, t , pay1, acc)
C (s1, t ,C (t , s1,⊤, pay2),flight)
C (na, t ,¬trip ∧ pay3,C (t , ,⊤, pay4))
C (na, ,¬EUcitizen, visa)
C (na, , swiss,¬visa)
Fig. 6. Commitment store in the running scenario.
Consider the scenario in which the agent a wants to book a trip to Valencia
from the tourism agency c. The company has contracts for flights with the air
company s1 and for accommodation with the business entity s2 (figure 6). The
agent t promises agent a to deliver the trip after he pays for it, represented
by the UC pattern C (t , a, pay3, trip). The capabilities of the agent t are repre-
sented by the CC explanatory pattern C (t , t ,flight ∧ acc, trip) in which, if he
manages to book the flight and accommodation, he can deliver the requested
trip for his client. The tourism agency is aware of the unilateral contract from
the accommodation company s2, given by C (s2, t , pay1, acc), and also of the bi-
lateral contract issued by s1: C (s1, t ,C (t , s1,⊤, pay2),flight). Here, the s1 agent
will provide plane tickets if the partner agent t promises to pay the amount pay2.
Given the location of the agent t within the European Community, it is doing
business under the jurisdiction of the corresponding normative agent na. Follow-
ing the contract law, the normative agent na requests to all its business entities
under its umbrella that an open offer accepted by a client should be honored, oth-
erwise the breaching agent should return the money and also pay penalties. The
composition between a unilateral contract and a gratuitous promise UC ◦p GP
is used to model this:
C (na, t ,¬trip ∧ pay3,C (t , client ,⊤, pay4))
Here, if the client pays the amount pay3 and he does not receive the trip, the
tourism company is committed to pay the amount pay4 = pay3 + penalty to the
client.
Assume that the tourism agency is an internalist 1-type credulous agent with
a convincing justification standard of proof. The client a is externalist, cautious
agent having the preponderance of evidence justification standard.
The agent a commences the dialog by requesting justification j guarantying
the trip in case he pays, given by the R pattern:
C (a, t , j :t Trip,⊤)
Being an internalist agent, the tourism company t can guarantee the trip based
only on its contractual clauses with the suppliers s1 and s2:
[C (s2, t , pay1, acc) + C (s1, t ,C (t , s1,⊤, pay2),flight)] :t Trip
We note the compound justifier above with J , such that J :t Trip. The first
term in J is a UC, whilst the second commitment represents a BC. Both terms
satisfying the proof standard of agent a, the compound justifier J will meet
the justification standard of agent a. Being an externalist agent, the client can
accept the justification of the agent t as valid:
[C (s2, t , pay1, acc) + C (s1, t ,C (t , s1,⊤, pay2),flight)] :a Trip
Note that in this line of justification, the agent t releases some private informa-
tion like the values pay1 and pay2.
Being a cautious agent, the client should check if there are explanations
supporting the opposite conclusion ¬Trip. Firstly, it requests explanans why J
offers enough justification for the formula Trip:
C (a, t , !J ⊳t J :t Trip,⊤)
Using the CC explanation pattern, the tourism agency explains based on its
business practice that plane tickets and accommodation are enough to provide
the requested trip:
C (t , t , acc ∧ flight , trip) ⊳t J :t Trip
Consider that the agent a is aware of the regulation requesting visa for non
EU citizens, formalized as C (na, ,¬EUcitizen, visa). This is the main concern
of the agent a for rebutting the Trip formula.
C (na, ,¬EUcitizen, visa) :a J :a ¬Trip
We note the above justification chain with J ′ such that J ′ :a ¬Trip. At this
moment the tourism agency may request explanations to agent a regarding his
concern:
C (t , a, !J ′ ⊳a J
′ :a ¬Trip,⊤)
The agent a can provide the explanation that he is not an EU citizen. This
helps agent t to figure out the case, but being a 1-type cautious agent it needs a
justification to accept the formula ¬EUcitizen. Such a justification is requested
through:
C (t , a, J ′′ :a ¬EUcitizen,⊤)
One option would be to object the request by activating the critical question
CQ4 of the R pattern, considering that the agent t is not legitimate to ask
for such justifications. The other option is to provide an ID card or passport
acting as a justification: swissPassport :a ¬EUcitizen. A fact being stronger
that a commitment according to proposition 2, it satisfies the preponderance of
justification standard of the t agent. Note that it may represent a constant in
the justificatory logic framework.
Knowing that Swiss citizens do not need a visa for traveling in Europe, the
commitment C (na, , swiss ,¬visa) undercuts the a′s justifier supporting ¬Trip
formula:
C (na, , swiss ,¬visa) :t ¬J
′ :a ¬Trip
We note the above justifier with J ′′′ such that J ′′′ :t ¬J
′ :a ¬Trip. J
′′′ com-
mitment refers to the agent t too, which is under the normative framework of
the agent na. Therefore, it can be used by the internalist agent t to constructs
justifications. Being cautious, the agent a needs a supplementary explanation,
requested with:
C (a, t , !J ′′′ ⊳t J
′′′ :t ¬J
′ :a ¬Trip,⊤)
The EU preferring to encourage traveling across Europe from safe countries,
rather then imposing unnecessary security constraints, explains why a visa is
not required:
[C (na, na,⊤, encourageTravel) ≻ C (na, ,¬EUcitizen, visa)]⊳tJ
′′′ :t ¬J
′ :a ¬Trip
Having both a justification and an explanation, the agent a accepts that his
visa concerns are defeated. Consequently, given the accepted valid justification
J for the trip, and no valid explanation for ¬Trip, the agent accepts the Trip
formula.
6 Discussion and Related Work
Justification Logic and Argumentation. In the proposed approach we apply the
justification logic mechanism to an argumentation context. The connection be-
tween explanation, justification, and argumentation is best evidenced in scenar-
ios where understanding is the focus (eg. learning). One reason is that the con-
structivist approach needed in understanding is employed by justification logic.
Justification Logic treats justification as the primary object, whilst the claim is
secondary. Quite the opposite, nonjustificational criticism works towards attack-
ing claims themselves, which is closer to classical approach in the argumentation
theory. The proof checker operator of JL promotes reflective communication or
deliberation on justificatory and explanatory knowledge.
The constants in JL can be mapped to prima facie arguments, which do not
require any sort of justification, whilst standard arguments should be supported
by justification chains. The framework of JEL assures that all arguments are
supported through a chain starting from prima facie arguments only.
The proposed framework applies the JL formalism to a multi-agent system.
Differently from existing approaches [21,14], we introduce the explanatory oper-
ator and force the justifiers to be social commitments. Particular to the classical
approaches in JL [7], the explanatory operator introduces non-monotonic rea-
soning in the JL framework. One of the advantages that commitments bring
in this justification logic landscape, is that there are more possibilities to define
communicative acts between agents: like requests or promises between conveying
agent a and receiving agent b.
Argumentation Dialogs. In the dialog typology of Walton and Krabbe [19], in-
formation seeking and inquiry dialogs implies a search for a true answer to some
factual question [5]. In this respect, justification and explanation are subtypes
of such dialogs. In the Habermas discourse theory [9], the classification includes
explicative, theoretical, and moral discourses, where explicative discourses aim
at increasing comprehensibility, whilst theoretical discourses try to discover the
truth.
A first step towards integrated argumentation reasoning with explanatory
reasoning is made in [4], where the distinction between argumentation and ex-
planation does not come from the statical structure or mode of reasoning (often
abductive for explanation, mostly deductive in argumentation), but rather from
broader dialogical context. Justifying reasons appear in two classes: epistemic
reasons and practical reasons, treated as arguments [1]. Epistemic justifications
(or theoretical reasons) are based only on beliefs and are used to justify beliefs.
Practical justifications are constructed from beliefs and preferences and used to
justify options or actions.
Compared to argumentation schemes, which aim to capture domain indepen-
dent argumentation patterns, our proposal is more business oriented. We try to
construct basic argumentation blocks used in negotiation and business process
monitoring. This represents a step towards developing an argumentation pattern
language directly applied on business process modeling languages.
Based on the content of explanation, rule-based systems exploit four types of
explanations: (i) trace, which shows the line of reasoning supporting the conclu-
sion, (ii) justification, describing the rationale behind each reasoning step, (iii)
control or strategic explanations, which bears out the problem solving strategy
or control behavior of the system, and (iv) terminological , providing definitional
information [23]. Justification-type explanations seems to give rise to more pos-
itive user perceptions of a knowledge-based system than trace and strategic ex-
planations [22]. Many knowledge-based systems address the issue of presenting
user-adapted explanations [23].
Explanation types depend on domain knowledge. Within the social domain,
folk psychological explanations are conveyed, in the physical domain both naive
and sophisticated theories, whilst in the religious domain explanatory standards
prevail. In our case, the main goal of seeking explanation in the business domain
is to increase the ability to make predictions and to understand normative-based
decisions.
Social Commitments. Explanation and justification are treated here as social
constructs. Commitments have been used within an argumentation framework
in [3], where argumentation relations as defend, attack, or justify are defined
between two commitments. In our case, the strength relation is inferred based
on the commitment pattern, whilst the preference relation depends on the agents
role in the commitment, as creditors or debtors. In both approaches, the agents
should be able to justify their commitments.
The expressivity arising from combining commitments have been exploited
for representing business patterns [6,18] or legal contracts [13]. The large amount
of work on commitments deals with modeling business patterns, which has been
proved satisfactory for real life business protocols. Often, a dialog occurs in which
the creditor requests for justifiers or performance, whilst the debtor provides the
requested justification or explanation in order to re-activate the commitment or
to find an alternative solution.
Defining commitment-based protocols is easier due to the closed word as-
sumptions when designing a protocol. This is not the case in argumentation
where agents may convey in an open world different types of justifications and
explanations. That is why an argumentation process is needed on top of the
commitments in order to assure the flexibility encountered in real life business
interactions.
7 Conclusions
The main goal of our study has been to propose a technical instrumentation for
handling both justificatory and explanatory arguments. The first contribution
regards the setting of some basis of exploiting in computational models of argu-
ments the differences between justification and explanation, as already stressed
out in the philosophy of science.
As a second contribution, the JEL is developed to cover both justifiers and
explanans, in the line of using logic in argumentation as envisaged by Gab-
bay [8]. Introducing commitments enhances the capability of agents to reason
over justifications and explanations of the other agents.
A third contribution regards the formalization of justificatory and explana-
tory commitment-based patterns. The individual actions are taking place within
a framework of interdependent social commitments. We consider agents as placed
in various networks of commitment relations with other agents, where social in-
fluences formulate the justification behind agents decisions [11]. The main benefit
here regards the flexibility to construct a large variety of higher order patterns.
Using together JEL with commitments provides opportunities for defining
several types of argumentative agents. Activating specific axioms in JEL, rigor-
ous or cautios agents can be formalized. The justification standard of each agent
is defined based on the strength relation between compound commitments.
As future work we will be investigating the role of critical questions in block-
ing justifications and explanations.
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